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Abstract. The environment has a strong influence on a population’s evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both
intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continuous change in nature. To model an ever-
changing environment, we develop a framework of evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions,
where individuals’ behaviors together with the games they play in one time step decide the games to be played
next time step. Within this framework, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and
find a simple rule: natural selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by
an altruistic behavior, b, to the corresponding cost, c, exceeds k − k′, which means b/c > k − k′, where k is
the average number of neighbors and k′ captures the effects from game transitions. We show that even if each
individual game opposes cooperation, allowing for a transition between them can result in a favorable outcome
for cooperation. Even small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our
work suggests that interdependence between the environment and the individuals’ behaviors may explain the
large-scale cooperation in realistic systems even when cooperation is expensive relative to its benefit.
1. Introduction
Cooperation is an integral part of biological systems and is of paramount importance to their prosperity.
But cooperation, an altruistic act of bearing a cost to provide another individual with a benefit, reduces
the survival advantage for the donor while fostering that of the recipient. Understanding how cooperation
can be maintained in a competitive world has long been a focal issue in evolutionary biology and ecology
[1]. The spatial distribution of a population makes an individual more likely to interact with neighbors
than with those who are more distant, which affects evolutionary dynamics [2]. Past decades have seen
an intensive investigation of the evolution of cooperation in structured populations [2–8]. One of the best-
known findings is that weak selection favors cooperation if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic
act, b, to the cost of expressing such an altruistic trait, c, exceeds the average number of neighbors, k, i.e.
b/c > k [3, 6]. This simple rule strongly supports the proposition that population structures can promote
cooperation, and it is widely accepted as one of the major mechanisms responsible for the evolution of
cooperation [1].
Despite these deep insights, empirical studies have produced evidence that many realistic systems are
highly-connected, with each individual having many neighbors on average [9]. For example, in the actor-
collaboration network, every actor has 61 collaborators on average, meaning k = 61 [9]. In such cases, the
threshold for establishing cooperation, based on the rule b/c > k, is extremely high: the benefit from an
altruistic act must be at least 61 times larger than its cost for cooperators to be favored over defectors. The
rule, although providing valuable intuition about when cooperation can evolve in structured populations,
is therefore often unattainable in practice [10]. The underlying mechanism for large-scale cooperation
in these systems, especially when cooperation is sufficiently costly, is of practical significance but still
largely remains an open question in the field. Here, we consider a natural way in which the cost-to-benefit
threshold can be relaxed significantly.
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In evolutionary game theory, the games played within a population affect individuals’ reproductive
success. Most prior studies have relied on an assumption that the environment in which individuals
evolve is time-invariant, meaning the individuals play a fixed game throughout the evolutionary process.
However, this assumption is not always realistic and can represent an oversimplification of reality [11], as
many experimental studies have shown that the environment individuals face changes over time (and of-
ten) [12–15]. Typically, overgrazing leads to the degradation of the common pasture land, leaving herders
with fewer resources to utilize in subsequent seasons. By constraining the number of livestock within a
reasonable range, herders can achieve a more sustainable use of pasture land [16]. In this type of pop-
ulation, individuals’ actions influence the state of environment, which in turn impacts the actions taken
by its members. Apart from endogenous factors like individuals’ actions, exogenous factors like seasonal
climate fluctuations and soil conditions can also modify the environment experienced by the individu-
als. Examples are not limited to human-related activities but also appear in various microbial systems
including bacteria and viruses [14, 15].
In this study, we use graphs to model a population’s spatial structure, where nodes represent indi-
viduals and edges describe their interactions. We propose a framework of evolutionary dynamics with
stochastic game transitions: individuals sharing an edge interact (“play a game”) in each time step, and
their strategic actions together with the game played determine the game to be played in the next time
step. We find that the game transitions can lower the threshold for establishing cooperation by k′, which
means b/c > k − k′, where k′ describes how the game transitions affect the evolutionary outcome. We
find that even if cooperation is opposed in each individual game, game transitions can favor the evolution
of cooperation. In particular, a slight difference between games can dramatically lower the barrier for the
success of cooperators. Our work provides a possible explanation for widespread cooperation. It also sug-
gests that transitions between games, if designed properly, give a promising mechanism for overcoming
social dilemmas and achieving global cooperation.
2. Models
We study a population of N players consisting of cooperators and defectors. The population structure
is described by a graph. Each player occupies a node on the graph. Edges between nodes describe the
events related to interactions and biological reproduction (or behavior imitation). In each time step, each
player interacts separately with every neighbor, and the games played in different interactions can be
distinct (Fig. 1A). When playing game i, mutual cooperation brings each player a “reward”, Ri, whereas
mutual defection leads to an outcome of “punishment”, Pi; unilateral cooperation leads to a “sucker’s
payoff”, Si, for the cooperator and a “temptation”, Ti, for the defector. We assume that each game is a
prisoner’s dilemma, meaning Ti > Ri > Pi > Si. Each player derives an accumulated payoff, pi, from
all interactions, and this payoff is translated into reproductive fitness using the formula f = 1− δ+ δpi,
where δ > 0 represents the intensity of selection [17]. We are concerned with the effects of weak selection
[18, 19], meaning 0 < δ 1.
At the end of each time step, one player is selected for death uniformly at random from the population.
The neighbors of this player then compete for the empty site, with each neighbor sending an offspring to
this location with probability proportional to fitness. Following this “death-birth” update step, the games
played in the population also update based on the previous games played and the actions taken in those
games (Fig. 1B). For the player occupying the empty site, the games it will play are determined by the
interactions of the prior occupant.
The game transition can be deterministic or stochastic (probabilistic). Deterministic transitions are just
special cases of stochastic transitions. If the game to be played is independent of the previous game, then
the game transition is “state-independent” [11]. When the game that will be played depends entirely
on the previous game, the game transition is “behavior-independent”. The simplest case is that games
in all interactions are identical initially and remain constant throughout the evolutionary process, which
corresponds to the classical setup in most prior studies [3].
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3. Results
In the absence of mutation, a finite population will eventually reach a monomorphic state in which all
players have the same strategy, either all-cooperation or all-defection. We study the competition between
cooperation and defection by comparing the fixation probability of a single cooperator, ρC, to that of a
single defector, ρD. Concretely, ρC is the probability that a cooperator starting in a random location gener-
ates a lineage that takes over the entire population. Analogously, ρD is the probability that a defector in a
random position turns a population of cooperators into defectors. We say that selection favors cooperators
relative to defectors if ρC > ρD [17].
3.1. Game transitions between two states. We begin with the case of deterministic game transitions
between two states. Here each state corresponds to a donation game (Fig. 2A; see SI Appendix, sections
3 and 4 for a comprehensive investigation of two-state games). In game 1, a cooperator bears a cost of c
to bring its opponent a benefit of b1, and the defector does nothing. Analogously, in game 2, a cooperator
pays a cost of c to bring its opponent a benefit of b2. That is, Ri = bi − c, Si = −c, Ti = bi, and Pi = 0 in
game i. Both b1 and b2 are larger than c. The preferred choice for each player is defection, but Ri > Pi in
each game, resulting in the dilemma of cooperation. We say that game i is more valuable than game j if
bi > bj. Assuming b1 > b2, the game transitions outlined in Fig. 2A imply that mutual cooperation leads
to a more valuable game than any other combination of actions since it is the only way to move to and
stay in game 1.
If every player has k neighbors (i.e. the graph is “regular”), we find that
ρC > ρD ⇐⇒ b1c > k− ξ
∆b
c
, (1)
where ∆b = b1− b2 and ξ = (k− 1) /2. Note that ξ is positive and independent of payoff values such as b1,
b2 and c. We obtain this condition under weak selection and based on the assumption that the population
size N is much larger than k. When b1 = b2, the two games are the same, which leads to the well-known
rule of b1/c > k for cooperation evolving on regular graphs [3]. The existence of the term ξ∆b/c indicates
that transitions between different games can reduce the barrier for the success of cooperation. Even when
both games oppose cooperation individually, i.e. b1/c < k and b2/c < k, transitions between them such
as those described in Fig. 2A can promote cooperation (see Fig. 2B). Our analytical results agree well with
numerical simulations.
The beneficial effects of stochastic game transitions on cooperation become more prominent on graphs
with a large degree, k. We find that a slight difference between games 1 and 2, ∆b, can remarkably lower
the barrier for cooperation evolving. For example, when k = 100 and c = 1, the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio (b1/c)
∗ decreases from 100 to 50.5 for ∆b = 1.0 (Fig. 2C). Therefore, stochastic game transitions may
provide a possible explanation for the persistence of cooperation in realistic and highly-connected societies
[9]. We find that similar results hold under the closely-related “imitation” update rule (SI Appendix, Fig.
S1 and section 3).
Next, we consider “birth-death” [20] and “pairwise-comparison” [21, 22] updating. Under birth-death
updating, in each time step a random player is selected for reproduction with probability proportional to
its fitness. The offspring replaces a random neighbor. Under pairwise-comparison updating, a player is
first selected uniformly-at-random to update his or her strategy. When player i is chosen for a strategy
updating, it randomly chooses a neighbor j and compares payoffs. If pii and pij are the payoffs to i and
j, respectively, player i adopts j’s strategy with probability 1/
[
1+ exp
(
δ
(
pii − pij
))]
and retains its old
strategy otherwise. For the game transition pattern shown Fig. 2A, under both birth-death and pairwise-
comparison updating, we have the simple rule (SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4)
ρC > ρD ⇐⇒ ξ∆bc > 1, (2)
where ξ = 1/2. When the two games are the same, ∆b = 0. Therefore, cooperators are never favored over
defectors when the players play a fixed game (Fig. 3AC). Stochastic game transitions provide a chance for
cooperation to thrive as long as b1 − b2 > c/ξ, which opens an avenue for the evolution of cooperation
under birth-death and pairwise-comparison updating. One can attribute this result to the fact that under
the transition pattern of Fig. 2A, mutual cooperation results in b1 − c but when two players use different
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actions, the cooperator gets −c and the defector gets b2. If b1 − b2 > c/ξ, then it must be true that
b1 − c > b2, which means that the players are effectively in a coordination game with a preferred outcome
of mutual cooperation.
More intriguingly, Eq. 2 shows that the success of cooperators fully relies on the difference between
benefits provided by an altruistic behavior in game 1 and game 2, and it is independent of the exact value
in each game (Fig. 3BD). Thus, in a dense population where individuals have many neighbors, even if the
benefits provided by an altruistic behavior are low in both game 1 and game 2, transitions between them
can still support the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we stress that the difference between the two
games required to favor cooperation is surprisingly small. For example, b1 − b2 > 2c warrants the success
of cooperation over defection on graphs of any degree.
We further examine random graphs [23] and scale-free networks [24], where players differ in the num-
ber of their neighbors (SI Appendix, Fig. S2). We find that the stochastic game transitions can provide
more advantages for the evolution of cooperation than their static counterparts under death-birth and im-
itation updating, and it gives a way for cooperation to evolve under birth-death and pairwise-comparison
updating. In addition, we study evolutionary processes with mutation or behavior exploration (SI Appen-
dix, Fig. S3). The results demonstrate the robustness of the effects of game transitions on the evolution of
cooperation.
3.2. Game transitions among n states. We proceed with the general setup of game transitions among n
states (i.e. games 1 through n). If two players play game i in the current time step and among them there
are s ∈ {0, 1, 2} cooperators, they will play game j in the next time step with probability p(s)ij . s is 2 for
mutual cooperation, 1 for unilateral cooperation/defection, and 0 for mutual defection. In the example
of Fig. 2A, we have n = 2 and p(0)12 = 1 since mutual defection (s = 0) leads to the game transition from
game 1 (i = 1) to game 2 (j = 2). This setup can recover deterministic or probabilistic transitions, state-
dependent or -independent (SI Appendix, section 4), behavior-dependent or -independent (SI Appendix,
section 4), and the traditional framework for playing only a single game [3, 5, 6], as specific cases. We
assume that all games are donation games (see SI Appendix, section 3 for any two-player, two-strategy
game). In game i, a cooperator pays a cost of c to bring its opponent a benefit of bi. Game 1 is the most
valuable, meaning b1 > bi for every i.
Under death-birth updating, we find that
ρC > ρD ⇐⇒ b1c > k−
n
∑
i=2
ξi
∆b1i
c
, (3)
where, for every i, ∆b1i = b1− bi, and ξi depends on the game transition pattern but is independent of the
benefit in each game, bi, and cost, c (see SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4 for the calculation of ξi). In fact, the
effects of stochastic game transitions on cooperation arise from two sources: the game transition pattern
and the variation in games. The former is captured by ξi and the latter by ∆b1i/c. Eq. 3 shows that the
term, ∑ni=2 ξi∆b1i/c, exactly captures how stochastic game transitions influence cooperation. Let k
′ denote
∑ni=2 ξi∆b1i/c and let b denote b1. We can interpret Eq. 3 intuitively: weak selection favors cooperation if
the ratio of the benefit from an altruistic behavior, b, to its cost, c, exceeds the average effective number of
neighbors, k− k′. Analogously, under birth-death or pairwise-comparison updating, we find that
ρC > ρD ⇐⇒
n
∑
i=2
ξi
∆b1i
c
> 1. (4)
We refer the reader to SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4 for the calculation of ξi.
Eq. 3 tells us how different environmental transition patterns affect the evolution of a system. In a two-
player interaction, players’ behavior profiles can be mutual cooperation, unilateral cooperation/defection,
or mutual defection. We can ask under which behavior profile the game transition has the most prominent
impact on evolutionary outcomes. Answering this question is of practical importance since it provides us
with insight into finding the right time to intervene in the environment in order to achieve a socially-
optimal evolutionary outcome for the population.
We study transitions among three states, namely, the most valuable game (game 1), a moderately
valuable game (game 2), and the least valuable game (game 3). We fix the game transition patterns for
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two behavior profiles and test how varying the transition pattern for the third behavior profile affects the
threshold for establishing cooperation (Fig. 4). For example, Fig. 4A shows that when defection (either
1C or 0C) leads to game 1, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b1/c)
∗ changes notably as the transition
pattern responding to mutual cooperation (2C) varies. We find similar results for the behavior profile of
unilateral cooperation/defection (Fig. 4B). When the transition pattern responding to mutual defection
varies, however, the effects on cooperation are negligible (Fig. 4C). Therefore, game transitions in response
to the behavior profile of mutual cooperation or unilateral cooperation/defection can have extremely
important effects on evolutionary outcomes. To build a cooperative society, game transitions responding
to the two behavior profiles should be carefully designed. A simple and efficient solution is transitioning
to the most valuable game once the two players cooperate and to the least valuable game immediately
once defection appears.
3.3. Pure versus stochastic strategies. So far, in every time step each player is either a cooperator or a
defector. But the framework we propose here has a much broader scope than just two pure strategies.
For example, we also investigate the competition between stochastic strategies under stochastic game
transitions. Let sp denote a stochastic strategy with which, in each time step, a player chooses cooperation
with probability p and defects otherwise. s1 thus corresponds to a pure cooperator and s0 a pure defector.
We find that the condition for sp being favored by selection over sq still follows the format of Eq. 3
under death-birth updating and Eq. 4 under birth-death/pairwise-comparison updating, provided that ξi
is modified (SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4). When the game transition patterns follow Fig. 2A under
death-birth updating, stochastic game transitions lower the threshold for a cooperative strategy (sp with a
large p) being favored relative to a less cooperative strategy. We also find that game transitions can favor
the evolution of a cooperative stochastic strategy under birth-death/pairwise-comparison updating.
3.4. Global versus local game transitions. Our study above assumes that in each time step, games played
by any two players are likely to update (“global” transitions). But in some cases, players could present
different tendencies in modifying the environment in which they evolve. For example, under death-birth
updating, if player i is selected for death, then only i’s nearest neighbors compete to reproduce and replace
i with an offspring. Compared with those not involved in competition to the vacant site, individuals close
to the individual to be replaced have stronger incentives to change the environment they face, since the
environment indeed affects their success of the replacement. In other words, games played by the nearest
neighbors of the dead drive the evolution of a system. Therefore one could impose transitions only to
these games, leading to “local” transitions (see Fig. 5A).
Birth-death updating requires competition at the population level, so global and local transitions are
identical in this case. For death-birth and pairwise-comparison updating, global and local transitions
lead to decidedly different models. We show that, however, the simple rules for cooperation to evolve
(Eqs. 3 and 4) still hold provided ξi is modified (SI Appendix, section 1). Specifically, when the game
transition pattern follows Fig. 2A, under death-birth updating we have ρC > ρD if and only if b1/c > k−
ξ∆b/c, where ξ =
(
6k4 − 10k3 + 3k2 + 6k+ 2) / (12k3), different from ξ = (k− 1)/2 for global transitions
(see Eq. 1). Under pairwise-comparison updating, ρC > ρD if and only if ξ∆b/c > 1, where ξ =(
10k2 − 4k+ 1) / (24k2 − 12k) (SI Appendix, section 4).
According to the nature of the critical threshold (b1/c > k − ξ∆b/c for death-birth updating and
ξ∆b/c > 1 for pairwise-comparison updating), global transitions act as a more effective promoter of
cooperation than local transitions do (Fig. 5BC). But for both kinds of game transitions, many messages
are qualitatively the same: game transitions promote cooperation (Fig. 2, Fig. 3, SI Appendix, Fig. S4);
game transitions notably amplify the beneficial effects of game variations on cooperation (Fig. 2, Fig.
3, SI Appendix, Fig. S5); and game transitions responding to mutual cooperation or unilateral cooper-
ation/defection critically affect cooperation (Fig. 4, SI Appendix, Fig. S6). We include a more detailed
discussion of global versus local game transitions in SI Appendix.
4. Discussion
In this work, we consider evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions, coupling individuals’
actions with the environment. Individuals’ behaviors modify the environment, which in turn affects the
viability of future actions in that environment. We find a simple rule for the success of cooperators in an
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environment that can switch between an arbitrary number of states, namely b/c > k− k′, where k′ exactly
captures how the games and their transitions affect the evolution of cooperation. When all environmental
states are identical, we recover the rule b/c > k [3].
We first study an intuitive scenario: mutual cooperation leads to a valuable game while the existence
of defection results in a relatively undesirable game. We find that even if both of the games oppose coop-
eration individually, transitions between them can allow cooperation to flourish. Moreover, the success of
cooperators largely depends on the variation in the two games, and even a slight variation can remarkably
lower the threshold for establishing cooperation.
For birth-death and pairwise-comparison updating, weak selection disfavors cooperation in any ho-
mogeneous structured population when the environment (game) is constant [3, 25]. Given the practical
significance of the two update rules [26], these results are disappointing. However, stochastic game transi-
tions give hope for cooperation evolving under the two rules. Importantly, the variation in the two games,
rather than what exactly each one is like individually, determines whether or not cooperation is favored
over defection. Thus, even when individuals play two relatively undesirable games, cooperation can still
flourish due to game transitions.
Our findings are of great significance to understanding large-scale cooperation in many highly-connected
social networks. In these networks, an individual can have hundreds of neighbors [9, 27], and cooperators
thus face the risk of being exploited by lots of neighboring defectors. If the environment remains constant,
cooperation must be profitable enough to make up for exploitation by defection—the benefit produced
by a cooperative behavior should be hundreds of times as large as its cost [3]. This requirement is often
unrealistic in real-world social networks. Stochastic game transitions thus provide a possible explanation
for the prevailing cooperation in such populations. Our findings hold for various populations structures,
from regular and random graphs to scale-free networks.
The main reason that spatial structure can promote cooperation is that local strategy dispersal leads
to an assortment of cooperators [2, 3]. Cooperators can resist the invasion of defectors through more
interactions with cooperators. But when mutation or random strategy exploration is allowed, a defector
is expected to arise within a cluster of cooperators, which then dilutes the spatial assortment. Mutation
thus hinders the evolution of cooperation [28]. When the environment changes as a result of individuals’
behaviors, although the defecting mutant indeed exploits its neighboring cooperators temporarily, the
environment in which this happens deteriorates rapidly. As a result, the temptation to defect is weakened.
In addition, in a constant environment selection favors the establishment of spatial assortment while
mutation destroys it continuously. The population state finally reaches a “mutation-selection stationary
(MSS)” distribution. But when the environment is subject to transitions, the interacting environment
would also be a part of this distribution. We refer to the joint distribution over individuals’ states and
games as a “game-mutation-selection stationary (GMSS)” distribution, which is an important avenue for
future investigations.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in exploring evolutionary dynamics in a changing environ-
ment [29–36]. Our framework here is somewhat different. First, our study accounts for both exogenous
factors and individuals’ behaviors in the change of the environment, modeling general environmental
feedback. In addition, the environment that two players face is independent of that for another pair of
players. Individuals’ strategic behaviors directly influence the environment in which they evolve, which
enables an individual to reciprocate with its opponent in a single interaction through environmental feed-
back. Therefore, even if cooperators are disfavored in each individual environment, cooperators can still be
favored over defectors through environmental reciprocity. Such an effect has never been observed in prior
studies where all individuals interact in a homogeneous environment [29, 31]. In those studies, although
at different times the environments individuals face are different, at any specific stage the environment
is identical for all individuals. When defection is a dominant strategy in each individual environment,
defection also dominates cooperation in the context of an ever-changing environment [29–31]. In a re-
cent seminal work, Hilbe et. al. found that individuals can rely on repeated interactions and continuous
strategies to achieve environmental reciprocity [11]. Compared with their model, in our setup individuals
play a one-shot game with a pure, unconditional strategy. Our framework shows that without relying on
direct reciprocity and any strategic complexity, stochastic game transitions still promote the evolution of
cooperation.
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The mathematical formulas obtained herein tell us which environmental transition patterns facilitate
cooperation and provide possible solutions to relax the dilemma of cooperation. To achieve this, a sim-
ple and effective transition pattern is one in which mutual cooperation leads to a valuable game, while
defection leads to an immediate transition to a less-desirable game. In this paper, we incorporate interde-
pendence of the interacting environment and individuals’ behaviors into an evolving population. Within
this framework, we can further discuss many important issues. For example, by adjusting the transition
probability, we can study how different time scales for the evolution of strategies and for the transition of
environment affect evolutionary outcomes [31]. In addition, playing edge-dependent games in structured
populations has attracted much attention [37, 38]. A prior study has found that when the environment
in each interaction is edge-dependent, the evolutionary process can be approximated by that in a trans-
formed and unified environment [37]. Our work provides further, promising results about the dynamics
of edge-dependent games.
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Figure 1. Stochastic game transitions on graphs. Each player occupies a node on the
graph and has a strategic behavior (blue/cooperate or red/defect) used in interactions
with neighbors (A). In each time step, each player plays a game with every neighbor
and accumulates its payoffs from all interactions. Games in different interactions can be
different, highlighted by the color of edges and relevant payoff matrices. At the end of
each time step, a random player is selected to be replaced and all games update. Players’
behaviors and the game they played in one time step determine the game to be played
in the next time step (B). For example, if both players choose to take “red” behaviors in
game 1, i.e. mutual defection, then they will play game 2 in the subsequent time step.
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Figure 2. Stochastic game transitions can promote cooperation under death-birth up-
dating. We study the transition between two donation games: a cooperator (C) pays a cost
c to bring its opponent a benefit b1 in game 1 or b2 in game 2; defectors (D) forgoes the
helping behavior (A). b1 is larger than b2. The arrow represents the game transition pattern
based on players’ behaviors (the number of cooperators) and the current game. Compared
with only playing game 1, stochastic game transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio (b1/c)∗ for the success of cooperation (see cross points of dots and the horizontal line
in B). Dots are by simulations and vertical lines represents analytical results. Parameter
values: N = 500, k = 4, δ = 0.01, c = 1, b2 = b1 − 0.9. In each simulation all players play
game 1 initially. Each simulation runs until the population reaches fixation, namely either
full cooperators or full defectors, and each value point is averaged over 106 independent
runs. A small difference between b1 and b2 (∆b = b1 − b2) remarkably reduces the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio (b1/c)∗ (C). We take k = 100 in C.
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Figure 3. Stochastic game transitions can favor cooperation under birth-death (A, B)
and pairwise-comparison updating (C, D). We study a population with a game transition
pattern described in Fig. 2A. When individuals play only game 1, cooperation is opposed
for any benefit-to-cost ratio, b1/c (A, C). Stochastic game transitions enable cooperation
to be favored over defection. With stochastic game transitions, the difference between the
two games, ∆b = b1 − b2, rather than the individual value of b1 and b2, determines the
success of cooperation (B, D). Parameter values: N = 500, k = 4, δ = 0.01, c = 1, and
b2 = 4 (A, C). In each simulation all players play game 1 initially. Each simulation runs
until the population reaches fixation, namely either full cooperators or full defectors, and
each point is averaged over 106 independent runs.
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Figure 4. Game transitions responding to mutual cooperation (2C) and unilateral coop-
eration/defection (1C) critically affect the evolution of cooperation. We study transitions
between three donation games, game 1 (the most valuable game), game 2 (a moderately
valuable game), and game 3 (the least valuable game). We take ∆b12 = 1, ∆b13 = 2, and
c = 1. Players’ behaviors determine the game to be played in the next time step. We fix
transition patterns for two behavior profiles and study how varying the transition pat-
tern for the third behavior profile changes the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, (b1/c)∗. For
example, in A, the presence of defection (either 1C or 0C) leads to game 1. When mutual
cooperation leads to game 2, (b1/c)
∗ = 150.5. (b1/c)∗ varies remarkably when the tran-
sition pattern responding to mutual cooperation changes. We find similar results for the
behavior profile of unilateral cooperation/defection (B). But when the transition pattern
responding to mutual defection (0C) varies, the change in (b1/c)
∗ is negligible (C).
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Death-birth Pairwise-comparisonB C
A
Figure 5. Global and local game transitions. Depicted in A is an example of game
transitions in a time step under death-birth updating. A random player (dashed circle) is
chosen for death; subsequently the dead’s neighbors (solid circle) compete to reproduce an
offspring into the vacancy with a probability proportional to fitness. Games in interactions
marked by thick lines have chance to update. With global game transitions, games in
all interactions update in each time step. With local game transitions, only the games
involved with players who compete to reproduce update. We examine both global and
local transitions under death-birth (B) and pairwise-comparison updating (C), where the
game transition pattern is given in Fig. 2A. Game transitions, regardless of whether
they are global or local, can promote cooperation markedly, although in this case global
transitions result in a more relaxed condition for the evolution of cooperation than do
local transitions.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (SI)
The supplementary information is structured as follows.
In Section 1, we derive a general expression of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for local game transitions.
We study three updating processes, namely death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating.
The birth-death updating process leads to the same result under both local game transitions and global
game transitions. We investigate this process in Section 4.
In Section 2, we discuss how the initial conditions (the initial fractions of various games played in the
population) affect the evolutionary outcomes. We provide an effective approach to evaluate the sensitivity
of evolutionary dynamics to the initial condition.
In Section 3, we derive a general expression of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for global game transi-
tions. We study four updating processes, namely death-birth, birth-death, imitation, and pairwise com-
parison updating. We prove that our rules also apply to the case when players use stochastic strategies
(cooperate or defect with a probability rather than unconditionally).
In Section 4, we study four representative examples, including state-independent game transitions (the
game to be played is independent of the previous games played), strategy-independent game transitions
(the game to be played is independent of interactants’ strategic actions in the past), game transitions
between two states (the example shown in the main text), and probabilistic game transitions between
three states (transitions between different games with a probability). We show that how probabilistic game
transitions affect the favorable effects of game transitions on cooperation may depend on the variations in
different games.
section 1. Evolutionary dynamics with local stochastic game transitions
Here we consider stochastic game transitions among n states, described by game 1, game 2, · · · , game
n. The payoff structure of game i is ( A B
A Ri Si
B Ti Pi
)
, (5)
where each value corresponds to a payoff derived by a player with a strategy in the column against a
player with a strategy in the row. The game transition pattern is described by three matrixes, i.e.,
P(2) =

p(2)11 · · · p(2)1n
...
. . .
...
p(2)n1 · · · p(2)nn
 , P(1) =

p(1)11 · · · p(1)1n
...
. . .
...
p(1)n1 · · · p(1)nn
 , P(0) =

p(0)11 · · · p(0)1n
...
. . .
...
p(0)n1 · · · p(0)nn
 , (6)
where p(s)ij represents the probability that players play game j in the next time step conditioned on that they
play game i in the current time step and there are s A-players, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and s ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
On graphs or social networks, each player occupies a node. If two players (or nodes occupied by players)
are connected by an edge or a social tie, they play a one-shot game in each time step. The main idea about
the theoretical analysis is to couple the game played by two connected players and their strategy profiles
into edges. Let E(i)XY denote an edge in which the two connected players take strategy X and Y respectively
(X,Y ∈ {A, B}) and they play game i in the current time step (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}). For example, in edge E(1)AA,
both the two connected players take A strategy and they play game 1. We then introduce the following
variables to describe this evolving system:
pA: the frequency of A-players;
pB: the frequency of B-players;
p(i)XY: the frequency of edge E
(i)
XY;
q(i)X|Y: the probability to find an edge E
(i)
XY given that one node of this edge is occupied by a Y−player;
pXY: the frequency of edges that connect an X-player and a Y-player;
qX|Y: the conditional probability to find an X−player given that the adjacent node is occupied by a
Y−player.
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Then we have the identities
pA + pB = 1, (7a)
n
∑
i=1
q(i)X|Y = qX|Y, (7b)
p(i)XY = q
(i)
X|Y · pY, (7c)
p(i)XY = p
(i)
YX , (7d)
qA|X + qB|X = 1, (7e)
pXY = qX|Y · pY. (7f)
Note that players’ strategies and the game they play coevolve throughout the evolutionary process.
From the perspective of network dynamics, we need to consider the change in the frequency of nodes
occupied by A−players and the frequency of edge E(i)XY. Based on above identities, we can use pA and
q(i)X|Y to describe the whole system. In the following, we study a random regular graph, where each node
is linked to other k nodes.
0.1. Death-birth updating process. In the death-birth updating process, in each time step, a random
player is selected to die; then all neighbors compete to reproduce an offspring and this offspring occupies
the vacant site with the probability proportional to its fitness. We can also depict it in a social setting:
a random player i determines to update its strategy; subsequently, it adopts a neighbor’s strategy with
a probability proportional to the neighbor’s fitness. The local transitions account for the fact that only
the nearest neighbors compete for the vacancy site. Compared with other players not involved in the
competition, these neighbors are more incentivized to modify the environment in which they evolve,
namely, the games they played. Therefore, under local game transitions, only games played by the nearest
neighbors of the dead have the chance to update. We first investigate the change in the frequency of
A−players.
0.1.1. Change in pA—updating a B-player. A B-player is chosen to die with probability pB. Let k
(i)
A|B denote
the number of neighboring A-players with who the focal player plays game i. Analogously, k(i)B|B denotes
the number of neighboring B-players with who the focal player plays game i. Therefore, ∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|B + k
(i)
B|B
)
=
k. The probability for such a neighborhood configuration is
B(k(i)A|B, k
(i)
B|B|i = 1, · · · , n) =
k!
Πni=1
(
k(i)A|B!k
(i)
B|B!
)Πni=1
[(
q(i)A|B
)k(i)A|B (q(i)B|B)k(i)B|B
]
. (8)
The fitness of a neighboring A-player with who the focal player plays game i is
f (i)A|B = 1− δ+ δ
[
(k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)A|ARj + (k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)B|ASj + Si
]
. (9)
The fitness of a neighboring B-player with who the focal player plays game i is
f (i)B|B = 1− δ+ δ
[
(k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)A|BTj + (k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)B|BPj + Pi
]
. (10)
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The probability that one of neighboring A−players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood
configuration is given by
P (A→ B) =
∑ni=1 k
(i)
A|B f
(i)
A|B
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|B f
(i)
A|B + k
(i)
B|B f
(i)
B|B
) . (11)
The probability that one of neighboring B−players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood con-
figuration is given by
P (B→ B) =
∑ni=1 k
(i)
B|B f
(i)
B|B
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|B f
(i)
A|B + k
(i)
B|B f
(i)
B|B
) . (12)
Therefore, pA increases by 1/N with probability
P
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
= pB ∑
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|B+k
(i)
B|B
)
=k
B(k(i)A|B, k
(i)
B|B|i = 1, · · · , n)P (A→ B) . (13)
0.1.2. Change in pA—updating a A-player. A A-player is chosen to die with probability pA. Let k
(i)
A|A
denote the number of neighboring A-players with who the focal player plays game i. Analogously,
k(i)B|A denotes the number of neighboring B-players with who the focal player plays game i. Therefore,
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|A + k
(i)
B|A
)
= k. The probability for such a neighborhood configuration is
A(k(i)A|A, k
(i)
B|A|i = 1, · · · , n) =
k!
Πni=1
(
k(i)A|A!k
(i)
B|A!
)Πni=1
[(
q(i)A|A
)k(i)A|A (q(i)B|A)k(i)B|A
]
. (14)
The fitness of a neighboring A-player with who the focal player plays game i is
f (i)A|A = 1− δ+ δ
[
(k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)A|ARj + (k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)B|ASj + Ri
]
. (15)
The fitness of a neighboring B-player with who the focal player plays game i is
f (i)B|A = 1− δ+ δ
[
(k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)A|BTj + (k− 1)
n
∑
j=1
q(j)B|BPj + Ti
]
. (16)
The probability that one of neighboring A-players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood con-
figuration is given by
P (A→ A) =
∑ni=1 k
(i)
A|A f
(i)
A|A
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|A f
(i)
A|A + k
(i)
B|A f
(i)
B|A
) . (17)
The probability that one of neighboring B−players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood con-
figuration is given by
P (B→ A) =
∑ni=1 k
(i)
B|A f
(i)
B|A
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|A f
(i)
A|A + k
(i)
B|A f
(i)
B|A
) . (18)
Therefore, pA decreases by 1/N with probability
P
(
∆pA = − 1N
)
= pA ∑
∑ni=1
(
k(i)A|A+k
(i)
B|A
)
=k
A(k(i)A|A, k
(i)
B|A|i = 1, · · · , n)P (B→ A) . (19)
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0.1.3. Change in pA. Let us now suppose that one replacement event takes place in one unit of time. The
time derivative of pA is given by
p˙A =
1
N
·P
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
+
(
− 1
N
)
·P
(
∆pA = − 1N
)
=δ · 1
kN
n
∑
i=1
(
IRiRi + ISiSi + ITiTi + IPiPi
)
+O(δ2), (20)
where
IRi = p
(i)
AA(k− 1)
[
(k− 1)qB|A(qA|A + qB|B) + qB|A
]
, (21a)
ISi = p
(i)
AB(k− 1)
[
(k− 1)qB|A(qA|A + qB|B) + qB|B
]
, (21b)
ITi = −p(i)AB(k− 1)
[
(k− 1)qA|B(qA|A + qB|B) + qA|A
]
, (21c)
IPi = −p(i)BB(k− 1)
[
(k− 1)qA|B(qA|A + qB|B) + qA|B
]
. (21d)
0.1.4. Change in p(i)AA. We proceed with the change in the frequency of each type of edges. Note that
when a random player like l is chosen to die, edges between l and its nearest neighbors (abbreviated
‘neighbors’) and edges between l’s nearest neighbors and the next nearest neighbors are likely to change
(see the description of local game transitions). We stress that the change in p(i)AA is different from that in pA.
pA does not change when neighboring A-players replace the focal A-player (namely the dead A-player)
or neighboring B-players replace the focal B-player (namely the dead B-player). But in the same case p(i)AA
probably change since games in these edges switch, resulting in the change in edge types.
First we consider the case that a random B-player is chosen to die. We take the same neighborhood
configuration as we do in Section 0.1.1, i.e., k(j)A|B, k
(j)
B|B for j = 1, · · · , n. The change in p
(i)
AA results from
two parts: the switching of edges connecting the focal B-player and its nearest neighbors, the switching
of edges connecting the nearest neighbors and the next nearest neighbors. Under the given neighborhood
configuration, the change in p(i)AA due to the former part is
P
∆p(i)AA = 2
[
∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji k
(j)
A|B
]
kN
 = B(k(j)A|B, k(j)B|B|j = 1, · · · , n)P (A→ B) . (22)
Equation (22) describes the edge switching of E(j)BA → E(i)AA, which occurs when (i) a neighboring A-player
occupies the vacant site, i.e., BA → AA; (ii) neighboring A-players who play game j with the dead in the
current time step play game i in the next time step, (j)→ (i).
The change in p(i)AA due to edges between the nearest and the next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)AA = 2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji q
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij q
(i)
A|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|B
kN

=B(k(j)A|B, k
(j)
B|B|j = 1, · · · , n) [P (A→ B) +P (B→ B)] . (23)
Equation (23) indicates that regardless of which neighbor (A−player or B−player) replaces the focal B-
player, the change in p(i)AA due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors remains the same.
Then we consider the case that a random A-player is chosen to die. We take the same neighborhood
configuration as we do in Section 0.1.2, i.e., k(j)A|A, k
(j)
B|A for j = 1, · · · , n. The change in p
(i)
AA due to edges
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between the focal A-player and its nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)AA = 2
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji k
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij k
(i)
A|A
]
kN
 = A(k(j)A|A, k(j)B|A|j = 1, · · · , n)P (A→ A) (24)
and
P
∆p(i)AA = −2k
(i)
A|A
kN
 = A(k(j)A|A, k(j)B|A|j = 1, · · · , n)P (B→ A) . (25)
Equation (24) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equa-
tion (25) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
The change in p(i)AA due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)AA = 2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji q
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij q
(i)
A|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|A
kN

=A(k(j)A|A, k
(j)
B|A|j = 1, · · · , n) [P (A→ A) +P (B→ A)] . (26)
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Analogously, one replacement event takes place in one unit of time. From equations (22,23,24,25,26)
The time derivative of p(i)AA is given by
p˙(i)AA = ∑
∑nj=1
(
k(j)A|B+k
(j)
B|B
)
=k
pBP
∆p(i)AA = 2∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji k
(j)
A|B
kN
 2∑nj=1 p(1)ji k(j)A|B
kN
+ ∑
∑nj=1
(
k(j)A|B+k
(j)
B|B
)
=k
pBP
∆p(i)AA = 2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji q
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij q
(i)
A|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|B
kN

2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji q
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij q
(i)
A|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|B
kN
+ ∑
∑nj=1
(
k(j)A|A+k
(j)
B|A
)
=k
pAP
∆p(i)AA = 2
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji k
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij k
(i)
A|A
]
kN

2
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji k
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij k
(i)
A|A
]
kN
+ ∑
∑nj=1
(
k(j)A|A+k
(j)
B|A
)
=k
pAP
∆p(i)AA = −2k
(i)
A|A
kN
 −2k(i)A|A
kN
+ ∑
∑nj=1
(
k(j)A|A+k
(j)
B|A
)
=k
pAP
∆p(i)AA = 2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji q
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij q
(i)
A|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|A
kN

2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(2)
ji q
(j)
A|A −∑nj=1 p
(2)
ij q
(i)
A|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|A
kN
=
2
kN
n
∑
j=1
{ [
k2 − (k− 1)qB|A
]
p(2)ji − k2δji
}
p(j)AA
+
2
kN
n
∑
j=1
[
(k− 1)qA|B + 1
]
p(1)ji p
(j)
AB +O(δ), (27)
where δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 otherwise.
0.1.5. Change in p(i)AB. When a B-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same
as that in Section 0.1.1, the change in p(i)AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)AB = −k
(i)
A|B +∑
n
j=1 p
(0)
ji k
(j)
B|B
kN
 = B(k(j)A|B, k(j)B|B|j = 1, · · · , n)P (A→ B) (28)
and
P
∆p(i)AB = ∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji k
(j)
A|B −∑nj=1 p
(1)
ij k
(i)
A|B
kN
 = B(k(j)A|B, k(j)B|B|j = 1, · · · , n)P (B→ B) . (29)
Equation (28) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equa-
tion (29) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
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The change in p(i)AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
(
∆p(i)AB =
(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji q
(j)
B|A −∑nj=1 p
(1)
ij q
(i)
B|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|B
kN
+
(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji q
(j)
A|B −∑nj=1 p
(1)
ij q
(i)
A|B
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
B|B
kN
)
=B(k(j)A|B, k
(j)
B|B|j = 1, · · · , n) [P (A→ B) +P (B→ B)] . (30)
When an A-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same as that in Section
0.1.2, the change in p(i)AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)AB = ∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji k
(j)
B|A −∑nj=1 p
(1)
ij k
(i)
B|A
kN
 = A(k(j)A|A, k(j)B|A|j = 1, · · · , n)P (A→ A) (31)
and
P
∆p(i)AB = −k
(i)
B|A +∑
n
j=1 p
(2)
ji k
(j)
A|A
kN
 = A(k(j)A|A, k(j)B|A|j = 1, · · · , n)P (B→ A) . (32)
Equation (31) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equa-
tion (32) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
The change in p(i)AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
(
∆p(i)AB =
(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji q
(j)
B|A −∑nj=1 p
(1)
ij q
(i)
B|A
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
A|A
kN
+
(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji q
(j)
A|B −∑nj=1 p
(1)
ij q
(i)
A|B
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
B|A
kN
)
=A(k(j)A|A, k
(j)
B|A|j = 1, · · · , n) [P (A→ A) +P (B→ A)] . (33)
Analogously, we have
p˙(i)AB =
1
kN
n
∑
j=1
(k− 1)qB|Ap(2)ji p
(j)
AA
+
1
kN
n
∑
j=1
[
(k− 1)(qA|A + qB|B + 2k)p(1)ji − 2k2δji
]
p(j)AB
+
1
kN
n
∑
j=1
(k− 1)qA|Bp(0)ji p
(j)
BB +O(δ). (34)
0.1.6. Change in p(i)BB. When a B-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same
as that in Section 0.1.1, the change in p(i)AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)BB = −2k
(i)
B|B
kN
 = B(k(j)A|B, k(j)B|B|j = 1, · · · , n)P (A→ B) (35)
and
P
∆p(i)BB = ∑nj=1 p
(0)
ji k
(j)
B|B −∑nj=1 p
(0)
ij k
(i)
B|B
kN
 = B(k(j)A|B, k(j)B|B|j = 1, · · · , n)P (B→ B) . (36)
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Equation (35) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equa-
tion (36) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
The change in p(i)BB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)BB = 2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(0)
ji q
(j)
B|B −∑nj=1 p
(0)
ij q
(i)
B|B
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
B|B
kN

=B(k(j)A|B, k
(j)
B|B|j = 1, · · · , n) [P (A→ B) +P (B→ B)] . (37)
When an A-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same as that in Section
0.1.2, the change in p(i)BB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)BB = 2∑nj=1 p
(1)
ji k
(j)
B|A
kN
 = A(k(j)A|A, k(j)B|A|j = 1, · · · , n)P (B→ A) . (38)
The change in p(i)BB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
P
∆p(i)AA = 2(k− 1)
[
∑nj=1 p
(0)
ji q
(j)
B|B −∑nj=1 p
(0)
ij q
(i)
B|B
]
∑nj=1 k
(j)
B|A
kN

=A(k(j)A|A, k
(j)
B|A|j = 1, · · · , n) [P (A→ A) +P (B→ A)] . (39)
The derivative of p(i)BB is
p˙(i)BB =
2
kN
n
∑
j=1
[
(k− 1)qB|A + 1
]
p(1)ji p
(j)
AB
+
2
kN
n
∑
j=1
{ [
k2 − (k− 1)qA|B
]
p(0)ji − k2δji
}
p(j)BB +O(δ). (40)
0.1.7. Different time scales. From equation (27), we have
p˙AA =
n
∑
i=1
p˙(i)AA =
2pA
kN(1− pA) (qA|A − 1)
[
(k− 1)qA|A − (k− 2)pA − 1
]
+O(δ) (41)
and
q˙A|A =
d
dt
(
pAA
pA
)
=
2
kN(1− pA) (qA|A − 1)
[
(k− 1)qA|A − (k− 2)pA − 1
]
+O(δ). (42)
When the intensity of selection is weak (δ  1), qA|A reaches the equilibrium point much faster than pA
[see equations (20) and (42)]. Thus the dynamical system converges quickly onto the slow manifold with
q˙A|A = 0. We have
qA|A =
k− 2
k− 1 pA +
1
k− 1 . (43)
We define a function A
(
R(s)
)
mapping (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix R(s) to a 3(n− 1)× 3(n− 1) matrix,
given by
A
(
R(s)
)
=
 2(k2 − α)R(2) 2(β+ 1)R(1) 0αR(2) (2k2 − k)R(1) βR(0)
0 2(α+ 1)R(1) 2(k2 − β)R(0)
 , (44)
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where α = (k− 2)(1− pA) and β = (k− 2)pA. Then we use P(2), P(1) and P(0) in equation (6) to define
(n− 1)× (n− 1) matrixes, given by
P¯(s) =

p(s)11 − p(s)n1 · · · p(s)(n−1)1 − p
(s)
n1
...
. . .
...
p(s)1(n−1) − p
(s)
n(n−1) · · · p
(s)
(n−1)(n−1) − p
(s)
n(n−1)
 , P˜(s) =

p(s)n1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · p(s)n(n−1)
 , (45)
where s ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Let b denote a column vector with 3(n − 1) entries: the first n − 1 entries are
pAA; the next n − 1 entries are pAB; the last n − 1 entries are pBB. Let v denote a column vector
(p(1)AA, · · · , p(n−1)AA , p(1)AB, · · · , p(n−1)AB , p(1)BB , · · · , p(n−1)BB )T . Combining equation (43) and p(n)XY = pXY−∑n−1i=1 p(i)XY,
we can reduce the system of equations (27,34,40) to
v˙ =
1
kN
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]
v+
1
kN
A
(
P˜(s)
)
b ≡ A¯v+ b¯. (46)
For a linear system described by equation (46), its equilibrium points can be obtained by solving[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]
v+ A
(
P˜(s)
)
b = 0. If for 0 < pA < 1, all eigenvalues of A¯ are negative numbers or
complex numbers with negative real parts, the system is asymptotically stable and has a single equilib-
rium point given by [1]
v = −
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]−1
A
(
P˜(s)
)
b. (47)
Ultimately, the system approaches to the equilibrium point, regardless of the initial state of
(p(1)AA, · · · , p(n−1)AA , p(1)AB, · · · , p(n−1)AB , p(1)BB , · · · , p(n−1)BB )T . In other words, the initial fractions of various games
do not affect the evolutionary outcome. We state that none of A¯’s eigenvalues can be positive, since this
leads to a few terms in v increasing above 1 or decreasing below 0 [1], which is unrealistic in the current
system. But A¯ may have zero eigenvalues. In such cases, the system described by equation (46) has
more than one equilibrium points. The initial state of (p(1)AA, · · · , p(n−1)AA , p(1)AB, · · · , p(n−1)AB , p(1)BB , · · · , p(n−1)BB )T
decides the equilibrium point that the system approaches. That is, the initial fractions of various games
influence the evolutionary outcome. In Section 2 , we provide a few approaches to efficiently evaluate the
dependence of the evolutionary outcome to the initial fractions of various games.
0.1.8. Diffusion approximation. For given game transition probability matrixes and the initial fractions of
different games, by solving equation (46), we have p(i)AA, p
(i)
AB and p
(i)
BB as functions of pA. Substituting p
(i)
AA,
p(i)AB and p
(i)
BB into equations (21a,21b,21c,21d) and combining equation (43), we have
IRi = (k− 2)(k+ 1)(1− pA)vi (≡ IRi (pA)), (48a)
ISi =
[
−(k− 2)(k+ 1)pA + k2 − k− 1
]
vn+i−1 (≡ ISi (pA)), (48b)
ITi = − [(k− 2)(k+ 1)pA + 1] vn+i−1 (≡ ITi (pA)), (48c)
IPi = −(k− 2)(k+ 1)pAv2n+i−2 (≡ IPi (pA)) (48d)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. We obtain IRn , ISn , ITn and IPn by separately replacing vi in equation (48a) with(
pAA −∑n−1i=1 vi
)
, vn+i−1 in equations (48b) and (48c) with
(
pAB −∑n−1i=1 vn+i−1
)
, and v2n+i−2 in equation
(48d) with
(
pBB −∑n−1i=1 v2n+i−2
)
.
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Here we consider a one-dimensional diffusion process of the random variable pA. Within a short time
interval ∆t, we have
E[∆pA] =
1
N
·P
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
+
(
− 1
N
)
·P
(
∆pA = − 1N
)
=δ · 1
kN
n
∑
i=1
(
IRiRi + ISiSi + ITiTi + IPiPi
)
∆t ≡ E¯(pA)∆t, (49)
Var[∆pA] =
(
1
N
)2
·P
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
+
(
− 1
N
)2
·P
(
∆pA = − 1N
)
=
2(k− 2)
N2(k− 1) pA(1− pA)∆t ≡ V¯(pA)∆t. (50)
The fixation probability φA(x) of A-players with initial frequency pA(t = 0) = x, satisfies the following
differential equation [see equation (5.2.186) in Ref [2] and detailed derivation therein]:
0 = E¯(x)
dφA(x)
dx
+
V¯(x)
2
d2φA(x)
dx2
. (51)
The solution of equation (51) is [see Eq (5.2.189) in Ref [2]]
φA(x) =
∫ x
0 G(y)dy∫ 1
0 G(y)dy
, (52)
where
G(y) =exp
(
−
∫ 2E¯(y)
V¯(y)
dy
)
=exp
(
−
∫
δ · N(k− 1)
k(k− 2)
n
∑
i=1
(
IRi (y)
y(1− y)Ri +
ISi (y)
y(1− y)Si +
ITi (y)
y(1− y)Ti +
IPi (y)
y(1− y)Pi
)
dy
)
=1− δ · N(k− 1)
k(k− 2)
n
∑
i=1
∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy+O(δ). (53)
In equation (53), the third equality holds when δ is sufficiently small.
0.1.9. Fixation probability. In a population of B-players, when a fraction x of B-players mutate to A-players,
the fixation probability of A-players is
φA(x) = x+δ · N(k− 1)k(k− 2)
n
∑
i=1
{
x
∫ 1
0
[∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy
]
dy
−
∫ x
0
[∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy
]
dy
}
. (54)
The fixation probability of a fraction x of B-players is
φB(x) = 1− φA(1− x). (55)
Then the ratio of fixation probabilities is
φA(x)
φB(x)
= 1+δ · N(k− 1)
k(k− 2)x
n
∑
i=1
{
∫ 1
1−x
[∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy
]
dy
−
∫ x
0
[∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy
]
dy
}
. (56)
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For sufficiently small x, we have
φA(x)
φB(x)
=1+ δ · N(k− 1)
k(k− 2)x
n
∑
i=1
{
x
[∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy
]
y=1
− x
[∫ (
Ri
IRi (y)
y(1− y) + Si
ISi (y)
y(1− y) + Ti
ITi (y)
y(1− y) + Pi
IPi (y)
y(1− y)
)
dy
]
y=0
}
=1+ δ · N(k− 1)
k(k− 2)
n
∑
i=1
[
Ri
∫ 1
0
IRi (y)
y(1− y)dy+ Si
∫ 1
0
ISi (y)
y(1− y)dy
+ Ti
∫ 1
0
ITi (y)
y(1− y)dy+ Pi
∫ 1
0
IPi (y)
y(1− y)dy
]
. (57)
Overall, for a sufficiently large population and x = 1/N, the condition for cooperation is favored over
defection (ρA > ρB) is
n
∑
i=1
[
Ri
∫ 1
0
IRi (y)
y(1− y)dy+ Si
∫ 1
0
ISi (y)
y(1− y)dy+ Ti
∫ 1
0
ITi (y)
y(1− y)dy+ Pi
∫ 1
0
IPi (y)
y(1− y)dy
]
> 0. (58)
Equation (58) holds for not only death-birth updating, but also for imitation (see Section 0.2 for details),
pairwise-comparison (see Section 0.3 for details) updating. Note that for different updating rules, IRi , ISi ,
ITi , IPi differ.
0.1.10. The rule b/c > k− k′. Next we consider donation games. The payoff structure for game i is
( A B
A bi − c −c
B bi 0
)
. (59)
Substituting payoff structures into equation (58) and using equations (21a,21b,21c,21d), we have the con-
dition for ρA > ρB under death-birth updating, given by
n
∑
i=1
αibi + αcc > 0, (60)
where
αi =
∫ 1
0
IRi (y) + ITi (y)
y(1− y) dy, αc = −
k2(k− 2)
k− 1 . (61)
Furthermore, we have
n
∑
i=1
αi =
k(k− 2)
k− 1
(
= −αc
k
)
. (62)
Substituting α1 = −αc/k−∑ni=2 αi into equation (61) and denoting (b1 − bi)/c by ∆b1i/c, we can rewrite
equation (60) as
b1
c
> k−
n
∑
i=2
ξi
∆b1i
c
, (63)
where
ξi = − k− 1k(k− 2)
∫ 1
0
IRi (y) + ITi (y)
y(1− y) dy. (64)
Inserting equations (48a) and (48c) into equation (64), we get the formula of ξi for death-birth updating.
Let k′ = ∑ni=2 ξi∆b1i/c and b = b1, we have the rule b/c > k− k′.
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0.2. Imitation updating process. In each time step, a random player i is selected to evaluate its strategy.
This player takes it own strategy or imitates a neighbor’s strategy proportional to the fitness. Analyzing
the evolutionary process as we do under death-birth updating, we have
p˙A = δ · k(k+ 1)2N
n
∑
i=1
(
IRiRi + ISiSi + ITiTi + IPiPi
)
+O(δ2), (65)
where
IRi = p
(i)
AA(k− 1)qB|A
[
(k− 1)(qA|A + qB|B) + 3
]
, (66a)
ISi = p
(i)
AB
{
(k− 1)qB|A
[
(k− 1)(qA|A + qB|B) + 2
]
+ (k− 1)qB|B + 2
}
, (66b)
ITi = −p(i)AB
{
(k− 1)qA|B
[
(k− 1)(qA|A + qB|B) + 2
]
+ (k− 1)qA|A + 2
}
, (66c)
IPi = −p(i)BB(k− 1)qA|B
[
(k− 1)(qA|A + qB|B) + 3
]
. (66d)
We redefine the function A
(
R(s)
)
as
A
(
R(s)
)
=
 2(k2 + k− α)R(2) 2(β+ 1)R(1) 0αR(2) (2k2 + k)R(1) βR(0)
0 2(α+ 1)R(1) 2(k2 + k− β)R(0)
 . (67)
Then the system under imitation updating can be reduced to
v˙ =
1
kN
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k(k+ 1)I
]
v+
1
kN
A
(
P˜(s)
)
b. (68)
All other variables such as α, β, P¯(s), P˜(s),b,v follow those defined under death-birth updating.
Furthermore, under donation games described by equation (59), we have the condition for ρA > ρB,
given by
b1
c
> k+ 2−
n
∑
i=2
ξi
∆b1i
c
, (69)
where
ξi = − (k− 1)k(k− 2)
∫ 1
0
IRi (y) + ITi (y)
y(1− y) dy. (70)
Solving equation (68) and inserting IRi , ITi in equation (70), we get the formula of ξi. Let k
′ = ∑ni=2 ξi∆b1i/c
and b = b1, we have the rule b/c > k+ 2− k′ under imitation updating.
0.3. Pairwise-comparison updating process. In each generation, a random player i is selected to evaluate
its strategy. This player randomly selects a neighbor j and compares their payoffs. Player i then adopts j’s
strategy with probability
1
1+ exp
[
δ(pii − pij)
] , (71)
where pii and pij denote i’s and j’s payoffs. Otherwise, player i remains its strategy.
Analogously, we have
p˙A = δ · 12N
n
∑
i=1
(
IRiRi + ISiSi + ITiTi + IPiPi
)
+O(δ2), (72)
where
IRi = p
(i)
AA(k− 1)qB|A, (73a)
ISi = p
(i)
AB
[
(k− 1)qB|A + 1
]
, (73b)
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ITi = −p(i)AB
[
(k− 1)qA|B + 1
]
, (73c)
IPi = −p(i)BB(k− 1)pA|B. (73d)
We redefine the function A
(
R(s)
)
as
A
(
R(s)
)
=
 2(4k− 2− α)R(2) 2(β+ 1)R(1) 0αR(2) (7k− 4)R(1) βR(0)
0 2(α+ 1)R(1) 2(4k− 2− β)R(0)
 . (74)
Then the system under pairwise-comparison updating can be reduced to
v˙ =
1
kN
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− (8k− 4)I
]
v+
1
kN
A
(
P˜(s)
)
b. (75)
All other variables such as α, β, P¯(s), P˜(s),b,v follow those defined under death-birth updating.
Furthermore, under donation games described by equation (59), we have the condition for ρA > ρB,
given by
n
∑
i=2
ξi
∆b1i
c
> 1, (76)
where
ξi = − (k− 1)k(k− 2)
∫ 1
0
IRi (y) + ITi (y)
y(1− y) dy. (77)
By solving equation (75) and inserting IRi , ITi in equation (77), we get the formula of ξi. Let k
′ =
∑ni=2 ξi∆b1i/c, we have the rule k
′ > 1 under pairwise-comparison updating.
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section 2. Approach to evaluate the sensitivity of evolutionary dynamics to the initial
condition
Here the initial condition refers to the initial fractions of various games played in the population. By
calculating the eigenvalues of matrix
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]
/(kN) in equation (46) and evaluating the sign
of all eigenvalues, we can tell whether or not under a specific game transition pattern the evolutionary
outcome is sensitive to the initial condition under death-birth updating for local game transitions. Analo-
gously, we can study matrix
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k(k+ 1)I
]
/(kN) in equation (68) under imitation updating and
matrix
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− (8k− 4)I
]
/(kN) in equation (75) under pairwise-comparison updating.
Here we provide an alternative approach to rapidly judge the dependence of the evolutionary outcome
on the initial conditions:
Based on the game transition matrix P(2), P(1), and P(0) in equation (6), we define a random process with
a state space E =
{
1, 2, · · · , 3n} with 3n states. The probability transition matrix for this random process
is given by
M =
 P(2)/2 P(2)/2 0P(1)/3 P(1)/3 P(1)/3
0 P(0)/2 P(0)/2
 . (78)
The entry in the ith row and the jth column in M is the transition probability from state i to state j. If
the defined random process has only one recurrent equivalence class, the evolutionary outcome is inde-
pendent of the initial fractions of various games, regardless of under death-birth, imitation and pairwise-
comparison updating rules. But if it has more than one recurrent equivalence classes, the evolutionary
outcome is sensitive to the initial fractions of various games.
For a random process defined by a state space E and a probability transition matrix M, we can examine
its recurrent equivalence class like this: letting M¯ = ∑3ni=1 M
i, the above random process has only one
recurrent equivalence class if and only if in M¯ there exists at least some is (1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) satisfying that
all entries in the ith column are positive; the random process has more than one recurrent equivalence
classes if and only if in M¯ for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) there exists at least an entry of 0 in the ith column.
Here we give detailed explanations. The sign of each entry in M¯, taking M¯ij (the entry in the ith row
and the jth column in M¯) for example, actually indicates the transition possibility (not probability) from
state i to state j within 3n-step transitions (less than or equal to 3n steps). M¯ij > 0 means that the system
can transit from state i to j through 3n or less than 3n times of transitions. For M¯ij = 0, the transition is
unlikely to happen within 3n steps, which indicates that the system entering into state i can never transit
to state j. If there exists some js (1 ≤ j ≤ 3n) satisfying that all entries in the jth column of M¯ are positive,
any state can transit to state j and thus state j lies in a recurrent equivalence class. In such a situation,
if there is another recurrent equivalence class, any state lying in the second class is unlikely to transit to
state j, which leads to contradictions. Therefore a column of positive entries suggests a single recurrent
equivalent class. Similarly, if there is only a recurrent equivalent class, any state can transit to one state in
the recurrent equivalent class. Thus there certainly exists a column of positive entries. Analogously, we
can prove that the lacking of a column of positive entries suggests more than one recurrent equivalence
classes. We provide examples with two states for a better understanding of these approaches. The game
transition matrixes are
P(2) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, P(1) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, P(0) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. (79)
Then we have
M =

1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0
1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0
0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
 , (80)
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which gives
M¯ =

631/290 0 129/49 0 56/47 0
0 631/290 0 129/49 0 56/47
86/49 0 122/49 0 86/49 0
0 86/49 0 122/49 0 86/49
56/47 0 129/49 0 631/290 0
0 56/47 0 122/49 0 631/290
 . (81)
There exist entries of 0 in every column of M¯. Thus there are more than one recurrent equivalence
classes and the initial fractions of various games affect the evolutionary outcomes. As a consistent check,
we calculate the eigenvalues of
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]
/(kN) in equation (46), given by λ1 = 0, λ2 = −(k −
2)/(Nk), and λ3 = −(2k − 2)/(Nk). The eigenvalue of λ1 = 0 also confirms the sensitivity of the
evolutionary outcome to the initial conditions. In Section 0.6 we illustrate how to calculate ξi in this
system.
Then we present a different example. The game transition matrixes are
P(2) =
[
1 0
1 0
]
, P(1) =
[
0 1
0 1
]
, P(0) =
[
0 1
0 1
]
. (82)
Actually, this case corresponds to the game transition pattern shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. Then we
have
M =

1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
 , (83)
which gives
M¯ =

49/34 36/49 49/34 56/47 0 56/47
49/34 36/49 49/34 56/47 0 56/47
36/49 50/49 36/49 86/49 0 86/49
36/49 50/49 36/49 86/49 0 86/49
37/81 36/49 37/81 631/290 0 631/290
37/81 36/49 37/81 631/290 0 631/290
 . (84)
Except for entries in the fifth column, all other entries in M¯ are positive. Thus there is only a recurrent
equivalent class. The evolutionary outcome is insensitive to the initial condition. As a consistent check, we
calculate the eigenvalues of
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]
/(kN) in equation (46), given by λ1 = −2k/N, λ2 = −2k/N,
and λ3 = −2k/N. Therefore, the system has a unique equilibrium root and the evolutionary outcome is
independent of the initial condition. In Section 0.6, we illustrate how to calculate ξi in this system.
Next, we briefly explain why the recurrent equivalence class of the defined random process can predict
the sensitivity of the evolutionary outcome to the initial conditions. The main idea in the explanation is
whether or not the initially assigned game between two connected players decides the game they play in
the evolutionary process later. For example, the transition pattern we illustrate in equation (79) describes
that if two individuals initially play game 1, regardless of their strategic actions, they will play game 1
throughout the evolution. Obviously, the initial game decides the game they play later. Therefore the
initial condition affects the evolutionary outcome.
We rename the elements in the state space E as
{
E(1)AA, · · · , E(n)AA, E(1)AB, · · · , E(n)AB, E(1)BB , · · · , E(n)BB
}
, where
the ith entry corresponds to the original state i. In the following, we analyze the state transition of an
edge throughout the evolution and we show that M captures such a transition. As defined in Section 1,
the state of an edge is given by E(i)XY, where X,Y ∈ {A, B} and i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. X and Y are strategies
of the two connected players and i is the game they play. The transition of an edge state can arise from
two parts: the change in players’ strategies, the change in the game they play. Let AA denote both players
taking A-strategies, AB denote one player taking A−strategy and the other taking B-strategy, BB denote
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both players taking B−strategies. Note that in the current model, in each generation, only a player has
chance to update its strategy. Thus, the strategy transition follows (i) AA can remain in AA or transit to
AB but can not transit to BB; (ii) AB can remain in AB or transit to AA or BB; (iii) BB can remain in BB or
transit to AB but can not transit to AA. That is, for any i and j, E(i)AA and E
(j)
BB are unlikely to transit to each
other, corresponding to the two null matrixes in M [see 0 in equation (78)]. The transition of the game
is governed by P(2), P(1) and P(0). For example, P(2) tells whether or not an edge of E(i)AA can transit to
E(j)AA or E
(j)
AB in an update step (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}), corresponding to those terms including P(2) in M. Note
that the realistic evolutionary process is much more complicated and it is impossible to obtain the exact
transition probability of an edge from one state to another, but matrix M can describes the possibility that
an edge of E(i)X1Y1 transits to that of E
(j)
X2Y2
in an update step. The zero entries in M indicate the transition
can never happen and the nonzero entries suggest the transition is likely to happen.
When the random process has only one recurrent equivalence class, let c denote the set of all states
lying in the recurrent equivalence class. Equations (20), (27), (34), and (40) show that for a sufficiently
small δ, the fractions of various edges change much faster than the fractions of the two strategies. That is,
although there is a frequent transition between A-players and B-players, namely, an A-player transiting to
a B-player or a B-player transiting to an A-player, the fraction of A-players varies at a greatly slow rate. In
the evolutionary process, an edge transits among various states as the strategies adopted by the connected
individuals and the game they play change. The state transition possibility of an edge is described by M.
Eventually, the state of this edge enters into the recurrent equivalence class c and can never escape from c,
regardless of its initial state. Thus, if the random process defined above has only one recurrent equivalent
class, the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial condition.
When the random process has m (> 1) recurrent equivalence classes, we denote them by c1, c2, · · · , cm.
Let E(i)X1Y1 → E
(j)
X2Y2
denote that an edge of E(i)X1Y1 can transit to E
(j)
X2Y2
within one update step. We apply two
propositions below:
(i) for E(i1)X1Y1 ∈ cj1 and E
(i2)
X2Y2
∈ cj2 , i1 6= i2 for any j1 6= j2 regardless of X1Y1 and X2Y2;
(ii) in every equivalence class like cj, there exists some is satisfying E
(i)
AA ∈ cj, E(i)AB ∈ cj and E(i)BB ∈ cj. For
different equivalence classes, i is different.
About proposition (i), for E(i)AA ∈ cj, since E(i)AA is a recurrent state, there exists l making either E(l)AA → E(i)AA
or E(l)AB → E(i)AA. Note that l can be i. E(l)BB → E(i)AA is impossible since in each generation just one player has
the change to update its strategy. E(l)AA → E(i)AA means E(l)AA → E(i)AB due to the strategy transition, leading to
E(i)AB ∈ cj. E(l)AB → E(i)AA means E(l)AB → E(i)AB due to the game transition, leading to E(i)AB ∈ cj. Thus E(i)AA ∈ cj
always gives E(i)AB ∈ cj. Similarly, E(i)BB ∈ cj gives E(i)AB ∈ cj. That is, E(i1)X1Y1 ∈ cj1 means E
(i1)
AB ∈ cj1 and
E(i2)X2Y2 ∈ cj2 means E
(i2)
AB ∈ cj2 . For j1 6= j2, i1 6= i2. Otherwise an edge state lies in two different recurrent
equivalence classes, which leads to contradictions.
Based on the proof to proposition (i), every equivalence class includes at lease one state with the form of
E(i)AB. Note that i in different equivalence classes is different. Let E
(i)
AB ∈ cj. Due to the game transition,
there must exist l making E(i)AB → E(l)AB and E(l)AB ∈ cj. In addition, due to the strategy transition, we have
E(i)AB → E(l)AA and E(i)AB → E(l)BB, which gives E(l)AA ∈ cj and E(l)BB ∈ cj. Overall, cj includes E(l)AA, E(l)AB and E(l)BB.
Proposition (i) stresses that when an edge transits into a state that lies in an recurrent equivalence class
like cj1 , games to be played by the two connected players are limited by cj1 . If the edge transits into a state
in another recurrent equivalence class like cj2 , the two connected players can only play games limited by
cj2 . In particular, the games limited by cj1 and those by cj2 are completely different. The initial condition
affects which recurrent equivalence class an edge will transit into. A representative example is that for
E(i1)AA ∈ cj1 , E(i1)AB ∈ cj1 , E(i1)BB ∈ cj1 and E(i2)AA ∈ cj2 , E(i2)AB ∈ cj2 , E(i2)BB ∈ cj2 , when all players play game i1
initially, the games to be played are limited by cj1 throughout the evolution. But if initially all players play
game i2, cj2 constrains the games to be played throughout the evolution. Therefore, the initial fractions of
games affect the evolutionary outcomes.
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We examine the above approach by 108 tests. In every test, we generate three 4× 4 random matrixes in
which all entries are nonnegative. We normalize these matrixes to make the sum of entries in each row 1.
The three matrixes are assigned to P(2), P(1) and P(0). On the one hand, based on P(2), P(1) and P(0), we
calculate the eigenvalues of
[
A
(
P¯(s)
)
− 2k2I
]
/(kN) in equation (46) and record whether or not there are
zero eigenvalues. On the other, based on P(2), P(1) and P(0), we calculate M¯ and record whether or not
there are some is satisfying that all entries in the ith column of M¯ are positive. In all tests, whenever there
is zero entry in each column of M¯, there are zero eigenvalues. As long as there exists some i satisfying that
all entries in the ith column of M¯ are positive, there is no any zero eigenvalue. Thus, our approach well
predicts the sensitivity of the evolutionary outcomes to the initial conditions. Furthermore, for P(2), P(1)
and P(0) under which the evolutionary outcome is sensitive to the initial condition, a slight perturbation or
noise to the game transition pattern (to P(2), P(1) and P(0)) can turn this system into one insensitive to the
initial condition. A simple way to achieve this is adding each entry in P(2), P(1) and P(0) by an arbitrary
small number δ1, δ2, and δ3, where δ1, δ2, and δ3 are not necessary identical.
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section 3. Evolutionary dynamics with global stochastic game transitions
In this section, we study the evolutionary dynamics with global stochastic game transitions. In each
time step, all games have the chance to update. We consider the game transition pattern [defined by
P(2),P(1),P(0), see equation (6)] that makes the evolutionary outcome insensitive to the initial condition
(see Section 2 for more details). Since in each time step, only one player among the whole population has
the chance to update its strategy whereas all games are likely to update, the evolutionary rate of the game
in an interaction (or in an edge) is much larger than that of strategies taken by two connected players.
That is, for two connected players, before their strategies update, the game they play updates for many
times. Therefore, the probability with which they play a specific game reaches a stationary distribution.
We can approximate the game to be played by the ‘average’ of the stationary distribution. For example,
for two cooperators, the stationary distribution of games they play, denoted by u(2) = (u(2)1 , · · · , u(2)n ), is
given by
u(2) = u(2)P(2), (85)
where the ith term in u(2) is the frequency at which the two players play game i. The average payoff for
the two cooperators is ∑ni=1 u
(2)
i Ri. Note that ∑
n
i=1 u
(2)
i = 1.
Analogously, the stationary distribution of games played by a cooperator and a defector, denoted by
u(1), is given by
u(1) = u(1)P(1). (86)
The average payoff for the cooperator is ∑ni=1 u
(1)
i Si and that for the defector is ∑
n
i=1 u
(1)
i Ti. The stationary
distribution of games played by two defectors, denoted by u(0), is given by
u(0) = u(0)P(0). (87)
The average payoff for the two defectors is ∑ni=1 u
(0)
i Pi.
Overall, the payoff structure corresponding to the ‘average’ game is
( A B
A ∑ni=1 u
(2)
i Ri ∑
n
i=1 u
(1)
i Si
B ∑ni=1 u
(1)
i Ti ∑
n
i=1 u
(0)
i Pi
)
≡
(A B
A R¯ S¯
B T¯ P¯
)
, (88)
which is independent of updating rules such as death-birth, imitation, pairwise-comparison, and birth-
death updating.
Under the death-birth updating, in equation (58), replacing Ri, Si, Ti and Pi with R¯, S¯, T¯ and P¯, then
inserting equations (48a,48b,48c,48d), we reduce equation (58) to
(k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
u(2)i Ri + (k− 1)
n
∑
i=1
u(1)i Si > (k− 1)
n
∑
i=1
u(1)i Ti + (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
u(0)i Pi. (89)
Under donation games with Ri = bi − c, Si = −c, Ti = bi and Pi = 0, equation (89) can be further reduced
as equation (63), where
ξi = −
(k+ 1)u(2)i − (k− 1)u(1)i
2
. (90)
Similarly, under the imitation updating, we can reduce equation (58) to
(k+ 3)
n
∑
i=1
u(2)i Ri + (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
u(1)i Si > (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
u(1)i Ti + (k+ 3)
n
∑
i=1
u(0)i Pi, (91)
which can be further reduced to equation (69) under donation games, where
ξi = −
(k+ 3)u(2)i − (k+ 1)u(1)i
2
. (92)
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Under both pairwise-comparison and birth-death updating rules, natural selection favors cooperation
over defection if
n
∑
i=1
u(2)i Ri +
n
∑
i=1
u(1)i Si >
n
∑
i=1
u(1)i Ti +
n
∑
i=1
u(0)i Pi, (93)
which can be further reduced to equation (76) under donation games, where
ξi = −
u(2)i − u(1)i
2
. (94)
Up to this point, we focus on the case where each player is either a pure cooperator or a pure defector.
In each time step, such a cooperator certainly chooses cooperation and a defector must defect. Here,
we further investigate the case where players take stochastic strategies, i.e., taking cooperation with a
probability and defection otherwise. Let sp and sq denote two stochastic strategies. Players taking sp
cooperate with probability p and defect with probability 1− p. If taking sq, players choose cooperation
with probability q and defection with probability 1− q. Analogously, for two connected players, before
one of them updates its strategy (i.e., sp or sq), their actions (i.e., cooperation or defection ) and the games
they played update for many times. We thus can approximate their expected payoff by assuming that
they play a repeated game with a sufficiently large number of rounds. One’s expected payoff is given
by its average payoffs per round. Then players use the derived payoffs to update their strategies, i.e., sp
and sq. We study the competition between sp and sq. This model can recover the case we explored above
as a specific case, namely, the case with p = 1 (pure cooperators) and q = 0 (pure defectors). For two
interacting players, one taking sp and the other taking sq, let u
(pq)
i,r1,r2(t) denote the probability that in round
t they play game i, the player with sp chooses r1 and the player with sq chooses r2, where i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
and r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1} (0 represents defection and 1 means cooperation). Then we have
u(pq)j,1,1 (t+ 1) =
n
∑
i=1
[
u(pq)i,1,1 (t)p
(2)
ij + u
(pq)
i,1,0 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,1 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,0 (t)p
(0)
ij
]
pq, (95a)
u(pq)j,1,0 (t+ 1) =
n
∑
i=1
[
u(pq)i,1,1 (t)p
(2)
ij + u
(pq)
i,1,0 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,1 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,0 (t)p
(0)
ij
]
p(1− q), (95b)
u(pq)j,0,1 (t+ 1) =
n
∑
i=1
[
u(pq)i,1,1 (t)p
(2)
ij + u
(pq)
i,1,0 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,1 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,0 (t)p
(0)
ij
]
(1− p)q, (95c)
u(pq)j,0,0 (t+ 1) =
n
∑
i=1
[
u(pq)i,1,1 (t)p
(2)
ij + u
(pq)
i,1,0 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,1 (t)p
(1)
ij + u
(pq)
i,0,0 (t)p
(0)
ij
]
(1− p)(1− q). (95d)
Assuming that the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial conditions, there exists a sta-
tionary distribution of games and players’ actions before two interacting players update strategies. Let
u(pq) = (u(pq)1,1,1, · · · , u(pq)n,1,1, u(pq)1,1,0, · · · , u(pq)n,1,0, u(pq)1,0,1, · · · , u(pq)n,0,1, u(pq)1,0,0, · · · , u(pq)n,0,0) denote such a distribution,
where u(pq)i,r1,r2 indicates the fraction of interactions in which two players play game i and the one with strat-
egy sp chooses action r1 and the other with strategy sq chooses action r2. From equations (95a,95b,95c,95d),
we have
u(pq) = u(pq)

pqP(2) p(1− q)P(2) (1− p)qP(2) (1− p)(1− q)P(2)
pqP(1) p(1− q)P(1) (1− p)qP(1) (1− p)(1− q)P(1)
pqP(1) p(1− q)P(1) (1− p)qP(1) (1− p)(1− q)P(1)
pqP(0) p(1− q)P(0) (1− p)qP(0) (1− p)(1− q)P(0)
 . (96)
We can get the stationary distribution u(pq) by the left eigenvector with ∑1r1=0 ∑
1
r2=0 ∑
n
i=1 u
pq
i,r1,r2
= 1.
Actually, letting u¯(pq) = (u(pq)1 , · · · , u(pq)n ) and solving
u¯(pq) = u¯(pq)
[
pqP(2) + (p+ q− 2pq)P(1) + (1− p)(1− q)P(0)
]
(97)
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with ∑ni=1 u
pq
i = 1, we have u
(pq)
i,1,1 = pqu
(pq)
i , u
(pq)
i,1,0 = p(1− q)u
(pq)
i , u
(pq)
i,0,1 = (1− p)qu
(pq)
i , and u
(pq)
i,0,0 =
(1− p)(1− q)u(pq)i . The expected payoff for a player with strategy sp against one with strategy sq is
fpq =
n
∑
i=1
u(pq)i [pqRi + p(1− q)Si + (1− p)qTi + (1− p)(1− q)Pi] . (98)
Under the death-birth updating, the condition for strategy sp to be favored over sq (i.e., ρsp > ρsq ) is given
by
(k+ 1) fpp + (k− 1) fpq > (k− 1) fqp + (k+ 1) fqq. (99)
We say that a stochastic strategy is more cooperative if players with such a strategy choose cooperation
with a larger probability. That is, for p > q, sp is more cooperative than another strategy sq. Under
donation games described by equation (59), equation (99) can be reduced to equation (63), where
ξi =
−(k+ 1)pu(pp)i − (k− 1)qu
(pq)
i + (k− 1)pu
(qp)
i + (k+ 1)qu
(qq)
i
2(p− q) . (100)
Similarly, under imitation updating and donation games, natural selection favors sp over sq if equation
(69) holds, where
ξi =
−(k+ 3)pu(pp)i − (k+ 1)qu
(pq)
i + (k+ 1)pu
(qp)
i + (k+ 3)qu
(qq)
i
2(p− q) . (101)
For birth-death or pairwise-comparison updating, under donation games, sp wins over sq if equation (76)
holds, where
ξi =
−pu(pp)i − qu
(pq)
i + pu
(qp)
i + qu
(qq)
i
2(p− q) . (102)
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section 4. Representative examples
Here we illustrate four representative examples under donation games. The results for arbitrary two-
player games can be derived analogously.
0.4. Evolutionary dynamics with state-independent game transitions. If the game played in one time
step has no effects on the game to be played in the next time step, the game transition is state-independent,
namely, p(s)im = p
(s)
jm for any i and j. The number of A-players determines the game to be played. We let
p(s)im = p
(s)
m . We consider the game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome is independent
of the initial conditions. For local games transitions, we have
Death-birth :
ξi =
(−6k4 − 2k3 − 3k2 − 6k− 2)p(2)i + (6k4 − 11k3 + 3k2 + 6k+ 4)p(1)i + (k3 − 2)p(0)i
12k3
;
Imitation :
ξi =
(−6k4 − 20k3 − 13k2 − 14k− 6)p(2)i + (6k4 + 7k3 − k2 + 10k+ 12)p(1)i + (k3 + 2k2 + 4k− 6)p(0)i
12k2(k+ 1)
;
Pairwise-comparison : ξi =
(−20k2 + 8k− 2)p(2)i + (19k2 − 10k+ 4)p(1)i + (k2 + 2k− 2)p(0)i
24k(2k− 1) .
For global game transitions, we have
Death-birth : ξi = −
(k+ 1)p(2)i − (k− 1)p(1)i
2
;
Imitation : ξi = −
(k+ 3)p(2)i − (k+ 1)p(1)i
2
;
Pairwise-comparison/Birth-death : ξi = −
p(2)i − p(1)i
2
.
In particular, if p(s)m = 1/n for all m and s, the game transition is fully stochastic. In the next time step,
any game occurs with the equal probability. For both local and global game transitions, natural selection
favors cooperation over defection (ρC > ρD) if
Death-birth : (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
Ri + (k− 1)
n
∑
i=1
Si − (k− 1)
n
∑
i=1
Ti − (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
Pi > 0;
Imitation : (k+ 3)
n
∑
i=1
Ri + (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
Si − (k+ 1)
n
∑
i=1
Ti − (k+ 3)
n
∑
i=1
Pi > 0;
Pairwise-comparison :
n
∑
i=1
Ri +
n
∑
i=1
Si −
n
∑
i=1
Ti −
n
∑
i=1
Pi > 0.
Let R¯ = (∑ni=1 Ri) /n, S¯ = (∑
n
i=1 Si) /n, T¯ = (∑
n
i=1 Ti) /n, P¯ = (∑
n
i=1 Pi) /n. We find that the evolutionary
process with stochastic and diverse games can be approximated by that under a static and unified game.
0.5. Evolutionary dynamics with strategy-independent game transitions. The stochastic game transition
is strategy-independent when the game to be played next time step is independent of players’ strategic
behaviors in prior interactions. That is, P(2) = P(1) = P(0). Let P(2) = P(1) = P(0) = P. Here we consider
the game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome is insensitive to the initial conditions.
34
For global game transitions, we introduce a vector u = {u1, u2, · · · , un}, which satisfies u = uP. Then
we have
Death-birth : ξi = −ui,
Imitation : ξi = −ui,
Pairwise-comparison/Birth-death : ξi = 0.
Note that in pairwise-comparison/birth-death, ξi = 0 means that cooperation can never evolve regardless
of the benefit provided by a cooperative behavior in the donation game. In other words, if the game is
independent of interactants’ strategic actions, stochastic game transitions may not promote cooperation.
0.6. Evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between two states (n = 2). Given the
theoretical significance of two states, we provide a systematic investigation of stochastic game transitions
between two states. We begin with the game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome is
insensitive to the initial conditions. According to equation (63), under the death-birth updating process,
the general rule for cooperation winning defection is
b1
c
> k− ξ∆b
c
. (103)
For global game transitions, we have
ξ =
(k− 1)p(1)12 p(2)21 − (k+ 1)p(1)21 p(2)12 − 2p(1)12 p(2)12
2(p(1)12 + p
(1)
21 )(p
(2)
12 + p
(2)
21 )
. (104)
For local game transitions, we have
ξ =
∫ 1
0
β3y3 + β2y2 + β1y+ β0
α2y2 + α1y+ α0
dy, (105)
where
α2 =− k(P0 − 1)
[
2(P1 − 1)(P2 − 1)k4 + (P1 + 2P2 − 3P1P2)k3 + (5P1P2 − 4P2)k2 − 3P1P2k+ 2P1P2
]
,
α1 =k(k− 2)
[
2(P2 − P0)(P1 − 1)k2 + 2(P0 − P1)P2k+ P0P1 − 4P0P2 + 3P1P2
]
,
α0 =k(k− 2)2(P0P1 − 2P0P2 + P1P2),
β3 =(k+ 1)(k− 2)3
[
p(2)21 (P1 − P0) + p(1)21 (P0 − P2) + p(0)21 (P2 − P1)
]
,
β2 =− p(2)21 (k− 2)2
[
(P0 − 2P1 + 1)k3 + (1− P0)k2 + (3P0 − 2P1)k+ 4P0 − 4P1
]
− p(1)21 (k− 2)2
[
(2P2 − 2)k3 + (2P0 − 2)k2 + (P2 − 3P0)k− 4P0 + 4P2
]
− p(0)21 (k− 2)2
[
(1− P2)k3 + (P2 − 2P1 + 1)k2 + (2P1 − P2)k+ 4P1 − 4P2
]
+ α0,
β1 =p
(2)
21 (k− 2)
[− 2(P0 − 1)(P1 − 1)k5 + P1(P0 − 1)k4 + (P0 + 4P1 − 2P0P1 − 3)k3
− 2(P0 − 1)(P1 − 2)k2 + P0(P1 − 2)k− 3P0 + 5P1 − 2P0P1
]
+ p(1)21 (k− 2)
[
(2P0 − 2)(P2 − 1)k5 − (P0 − 1)(P2 − 1)k4 + (2P2 − 3)(P0 − 1)k3
+ (2P0P2 − 4P2 − 6P0 + 6)k2 + (2P0 + 3P2 − P0P2)k+ 3P0 − 5P2 + 2P0P2
]
+ p(0)21 (k− 2)
[
(1− P2)k4 + (P2 − P1)k3 + (4P1 − 2)k2 − 3P2k− 5P1 + 5P2
]
+ α1,
β0 =− p(2)21 (1− P0)
[
(2− 2P1)k5 + P1k4 + (2− 2P1)k3 + (3− 2P1)k2 + P1k− 2P1
]
+ p(1)21 (1− P0)
[
−2P2k4 + (3P2 + 1)k3 + (4− 5P2)k2 + 3P2k− 2P2
]
− p(0)21
[
(P1 + P2 − 1)k3 + (1− 2P2 − 2P1)k2 + (3P2 − P1)k+ 2P1 − 2P2
]
+ α2.
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In above equations, P2 = p
(2)
11 − p(2)21 , P1 = p(1)11 − p(1)21 and P0 = p(0)11 − p(0)21 .
We proceed with a specific game transition pattern involving two states, as illustrated in Fig. 2A in
the main text. The game transition matrix describing this transition pattern is shown in equation (82). In
Section 2, we have shown that the evolutionary process with such a game transition pattern is insensitive
to the initial conditions. Inserting equation (82) in equations (104) and (105), we have equation (103) with
ξ = (k− 1) /2 for global transitions and ξ = (6k4 − 10k3 + 3k2 + 6k+ 2) / (12k3) for local transitions.
Equation (103) corresponds to equation (1) in the main text. For the pairwise-comparison updating,
analogously, we have
ρC > ρD ⇐⇒ ξ∆bc > 1, (106)
where ξ = 1/2 for global game transitions and ξ =
(
10k2 − 4k+ 1) / (24k2 − 12k) for local game transi-
tions. Equation (106) corresponds to equation (2) in the main text.
If the game transition pattern follows Fig. 2A in the main text, in the competition between two stochastic
strategies, i.e., sp and sq (p > q), from equations (100) and (102), we have
ρsp > ρsq ⇐⇒
b1
c
> k− (k+ 1)(p
2 + q2) + 2pq− 2
2
∆b
c
(107)
under the death-birth updating and
ρsp > ρsq ⇐⇒
p2 + q2
2
∆b
c
> 1 (108)
under birth-death and pairwise-comparison updating. Equation (107) shows that for a large value of p,
game transitions lower the threshold for ρsp > ρsq relative to only playing a fixed game, i.e., ∆b = 0.
Equation (108) shows that game transitions make it possible for cooperative stochastic strategies winning
less cooperative stochastic strategies under birth-death/pairwise-comparison updating, which can never
be observed when players play a fixed game.
Then we consider a game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome relies on the initial
condition. We provide an idea to deal with such systems. The game transition matrixes are shown in
equation (79). M in equation (78) is given by
M =

E(1)AA E
(2)
AA E
(1)
AB E
(2)
AB E
(1)
BB E
(2)
BB
E(1)AA 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 0
E(2)AA 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0
E(1)AB 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 0
E(2)AB 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3
E(1)BB 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0
E(2)BB 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2

. (109)
Switching a few row entries and column entries, we have
M˜ =

E(1)AA E
(1)
AB E
(1)
BB E
(2)
AA E
(2)
AB E
(2)
BB
E(1)AA 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0
E(1)AB 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0
E(1)BB 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 0
E(2)AA 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
E(2)AB 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
E(2)BB 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2

. (110)
By analyzing M˜, we get E(1)AA, E
(1)
AB, E
(1)
BB belonging to one recurrent equivalence class, and E
(2)
AA, E
(2)
AB, E
(2)
BB
belonging to the other recurrent equivalence class. Thus the original system can be reduced into two
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subsystems, one consisting of E(1)AA, E
(1)
AB, E
(1)
BB and the other consisting of E
(2)
AA, E
(2)
AB, E
(2)
BB . Here we deal with
the subsystem consisting of E(1)AA, E
(1)
AB, E
(1)
BB . Substituting P
(2), P(1) and P(0) into equation (46), we have
v˙ = A¯v. The eigenvalues of matrix A¯ are λ1 = 0,λ2 = −(k− 2)/(kN),λ3 = −(2k− 2)/(kN), where λ2
and λ3 are negative for k > 2. Decomposing A¯ into A¯ = VDV−1, where
V =
 −
pA(kpA−2pA+1)
(pA−1)(k+2pA−kpA−1) −
kpA−2pA+1
k+2pA−kpA−1 1
pA(k−2)
k+2pA−kpA−1 −
k+4pA−2kpA−2
2(k+2pA−kpA−1) −1
1 1 1
 , D =
 0 0 00 − k−2kN 0
0 0 − 2k−2kN
 . (111)
We can get p(1)AA(t), p
(1)
AB(t) and p
(1)
BB(t) as a function of time t, given by p
(1)
AA(t)
p(1)AB(t)
p(1)BB(t)
 = VeDtV−1
 p
(1)
AA(t0)
p(1)AB(t0)
p(1)BB(t0)
 , (112)
where the initial values of p(1)AA, p
(2)
AB, p
(3)
BB are denoted by p
(1)
AA(t0), p
(1)
AB(t0), p
(1)
BB(t0). When t approaches to
infinity, we have
p(1)AA(∞) =
(k− 2)p2A + pA
k− 1
(
p(1)AA(t0) + 2p
(1)
AB(t0) + p
(1)
BB(t0)
)
, (113a)
p(1)AB(∞) = −
(k− 2)p2A − (k− 2)pA
k− 1
(
p(1)AA(t0) + 2p
(1)
AB(t0) + p
(1)
BB(t0)
)
, (113b)
p(1)BB(∞) =
(k− 2)p2A + (3− 2k)pA + k− 1
k− 1
(
p(1)AA(t0) + 2p
(1)
AB(t0) + p
(1)
BB(t0)
)
. (113c)
Note that p(1)AA(t0) + 2p
(1)
AB(t0) + p
(1)
BB(t0) is the initial frequency of game 1, denoted by p
(1). Then we have
p(1)AA, p
(1)
AB, and p
(1)
BB as functions of pA and p
(1). Analogously, p(2)AA, p
(2)
AB, and p
(2)
BB as functions of pA and
p(2). Substituting p(1)AA, p
(1)
AB, p
(1)
BB and p
(2)
AA, p
(2)
AB, p
(2)
BB into equations (48a,48b,48c,48d), then we can reduce
equation (58) to
(k+ 1)
2
∑
i=1
p(i)Ri + (k− 1)
2
∑
i=1
p(i)Si − (k− 1)
2
∑
i=1
p(i)Ti − (k+ 1)
2
∑
i=1
p(i)Pi > 0. (114)
For donation games, we have
b1
c
> k+ p(2)
∆b12
c
, (115)
which gives ξ = −p(2). ξ shows that the evolutionary outcome is sensitive to the initial fractions of various
games.
0.7. Evolutionary dynamics with probabilistic game transitions among three states (n = 3). All exam-
ples that we examine in the main text and in Section 0.6 exhibit a deterministic game transition. That is,
the game to be played in the next time step is exactly determined. In this section, we present an example
with probabilistic game transitions among three states (Fig. S7). Game 1 is the most valuable and game 3
is the least valuable, i.e., b1 > b2 > b3. The game transition matrixes are given by
P(2) =
1 0 0p 1− p 0
p 0 1− p
 , P(1) =
1− p p 00 1 0
0 p 1− p
 , P(0) =
1− p 0 p0 1− p p
0 0 1
 .
Mutual cooperation (resp. defection) is prone to yield game 1 (resp. 3) and unilateral defection a moder-
ately valuable game 2. The game transition occurs with a probability p and players play the old game with
a probability 1− p. For p = 0, by virtue of the approach in Section 2 , we can tell that the evolutionary
outcome relies on the initial condition. We can refer to the example in Section 0.6, to derive the evolution-
ary outcome. For p > 0, the evolutionary outcome is thus independent of the initial condition. Note that
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p = 1 corresponds to the deterministic case. Under the death-birth updating process, the general rule for
cooperation wining defection is
ρC > ρD ⇐⇒ b1c > k− ξ2
∆b12
c
− ξ3∆b13c . (116)
For local game transitions, we have
ξ2 =
(6k5 − 15k4 + 24k3 − 24k2 + 15k− 6)p2 + (4k4 − 21k3 + 32k2 − 19k+ 14)p− 2k2 + 8k− 8
(12k4 − 18k3 + 30k2 − 18k+ 12)p2 + (18k3 − 36k2 + 36k− 24)p+ 6k2 − 18k+ 12 (117)
and
ξ3 =
(k4 + 2k2 − 7k+ 2)p− 2k2 + 5k− 2
(12k4 − 18k3 + 30k2 − 18k+ 12)p2 + (18k3 − 36k2 + 36k− 24)p+ 6k2 − 18k+ 12 . (118)
Here we analyze how the probabilistic transition measured by p affects the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
(b1/c)∗ above which ρC > ρD. Analyzing (b1/c)∗ = k− ξ2∆b12/c− ξ3∆b13/c, we get a threshold(
∆b13
∆b12
)∗
= 5− 3(k+ 4)(k
2 + 2k− 2)
2k5 − 3k4 + 6k2 + 2k− 8 . (119)
If ∆b12/∆b13 is lower than (∆b12/∆b13)
∗, (b1/c)∗ decreases monotonously as the increasing p. If ∆b12/∆b13
is larger than (∆b12/∆b13)
∗, (b1/c)∗ switches to a non-monotonous function of p. Concretely, as p in-
creases starting from a value slightly larger than 0, (b1/c)∗ decreases first and then increases. The optimal
transition probability p for collective cooperation is
p∗ = φ2r+ φ3 +
√
φ4r2 + φ5r+ φ6
φ0r+ φ1
, (120)
where
φ0 =k4 + 2k2 − 7k+ 2,
φ1 =− 5k4 + 6k3 − 4k2 + 11k+ 2,
φ2 =(2k− 1)(k− 2),
φ3 =(k− 2)(3k2 − 4k− 1),
φ4 =(−k3 − 4k2 + 2k+ 2)φ7,
φ5 =(k3 + 13k2 − 8k− 8)φ7,
φ6 =(2k3 − 10k2 + 8k+ 8)φ7,
φ7 =− k2(k− 2)(k2 − k− 1)(k2 + 2k− 2)/
(
(2k2 − k+ 2)(k2 − k+ 1)
)
.
As shown in Fig. S7, probabilistic game transitions can strengthen or weaken the promotive effects of game
transitions on the evolution of cooperation, which depends on the variations in games. The conclusion is
consistent in other updating rules like imitation and pairwise-comparison updating rules.
But things are not the case for global game transitions, where the related parameters are ξ2 = (k− 1)/2
and ξ3 = 0. Thus in this case, probabilistic transitions do not affect the effects of game transitions on the
evolution of cooperation.
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Figure S1. Stochastic game transitions can promote cooperation. We study evolution-
ary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between two states and the game transition
pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. We examine death-birth (A), imitation (B),
pairwise-comparison (C) and birth-death (D) updating on random regular graphs. The
cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines mark the critical benefit-to-cost ratios for
cooperation winning defection, i.e., ρC > ρD, by numerical simulations. The vertical lines
present the analytical critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Under death-birth and imitation up-
dating, stochastic game transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost for ρC > ρD. Under
pairwise-comparison and birth-death updating, stochastic game transitions make it pos-
sible for ρC > ρD. We take N = 500, k = 4, δ = 0.01, c = 1. Other parameters: b2 = b1 − 1
for death-birth and imitation updating, b2 = 4 for pairwise-comparison and birth-death
updating. Each simulation runs until the population reaches fixation and each value point
is averaged over 106 simulations.
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Figure S2. Stochastic game transitions can promote cooperation on social networks.
We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between 2 states and the
game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. We examine death-birth (A),
imitation (B), pairwise-comparison (C), and birth-death (D) updating on random graphs
[3] and scale-free networks [4, 5]. The cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines
mark the critical benefit-to-cost ratios for cooperation winning defection by numerical
simulations. The vertical lines present the analytical critical benefit-to-cost ratios based on
random regular graphs. The average degree of the random regular graph and the scale-
free networks is 4. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig. S1. Stochastic game
transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost for the success of cooperators (ρC > ρD).
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Figure S3. Stochastic game transitions can promote cooperation in the presence of
mutation/random strategy exploration. We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic
game transitions between 2 states and the game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in
the main text. We investigate the death-birth updating on random regular graphs. With
probability 1− µ, the empty site is occupied by the neighbor’s offspring. With probability
µ, the empty is occupied by a cooperator or a defector with equal probability. Here the
frequency of cooperative strategies 〈 fC〉 is used to measure the success of cooperators.
Cooperation wins defection if 〈 fC〉 > 1/2. We obtain each data point by averaging 〈 fC〉
in 100 independent runs. For each run, 〈 fC〉 is obtained by averaging the frequency of
cooperative strategies in the last 2× 107 after a transient time of 2× 107 time steps. We
take N = 500, k = 4, b2 = b1 − 1, δ = 0.01, and c = 1. Other parameters: µ = 0.05 (A),
µ = 0.1 (B), and µ = 0.4 (C). The cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines mark the
critical benefit-to-cost ratios for cooperation winning defection (〈 fC〉 > 1/2). Stochastic
games transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost for the success of cooperators.
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Figure S4. Local game transitions can promote cooperation. We study evolutionary
dynamics with stochastic game transitions between 2 states and the game transition pat-
tern is shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. We examine death-birth (A), imitation (B)
and pairwise-comparison (C) on random regular graphs, random graphs, and scale-free
networks. The cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines mark the critical benefit-to-
cost ratios for cooperation winning defection by numerical simulations. The vertical lines
present the analytical critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Stochastic game transitions reduce the
critical benefit-to-cost for the success of cooperators (ρC > ρD). All parameters are the
same as those in Fig. S1.
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Figure S5. With local game transitions a small variation in different games can pro-
mote cooperation markedly. We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game
transitions between 2 states and the game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in
the main text. We examine death-birth (A) and pairwise-comparison (B) updating on
random regular graphs. Under the death-birth updating, a small difference between b1
and b2 (∆b = b1 − b2) remarkably reduces the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (A). Under the
pairwise-comparison updating, the difference between games, b1 − b2, rather than the in-
dividual value of b1 and b2, determines the success of cooperators (B). Except b1 and b2,
all other parameters follow Fig. S1.
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Figure S6. Local game transitions responding to mutual cooperation (2C) and unilat-
eral cooperation/defection (1C) critically affect the evolution of cooperation. We study
the transition between three donation games, game 1 (the most valuable game), game 2
(the moderately valuable game), and game 3 (the least valuable game). We take ∆b12 = 1,
∆b13 = 2, and c = 1. Players’ behaviors determine the game to be played next time step.
We fix transition patterns for two behavior profiles and study how varying the transition
pattern for the third behavior profile changes the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b1/c)∗. For
example, in A, the presence of defection (1C, 0C) leads to a following game 1. When
mutual cooperation leads to a following game 2, (b1/c)
∗ is 150.2. (b1/c)∗ varies remark-
ably when the transition pattern responding to mutual cooperation change. We find the
similar results for the behavior profile of unilateral cooperation/defection (B). But when
the transition pattern responding to mutual defection (0C) varies, the change in (b1/c)
∗ is
negligible (C).
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Figure S7. Local probabilistic game transitions can strengthen the promotive effects
of game transitions on cooperation. We study the transition among three games, game
1 (the most valuable game), game 2 (the moderately valuable game), and game 3 (the
least valuable game). The arrow shows the game transition based on players’ behaviors
and the current game, where p is the transition probability (A). If p = 1, the transition is
deterministic: mutual cooperation always leads to the most valuable game to be played
and mutual defection the least valuable game. The probabilistic transition can strengthen
cooperation if the difference between benefits provided by an altruistic behavior in game
1 and 3 (∆b13 = b1 − b3), divided by that in game 1 and 2 (∆b12 = b1 − b3), exceeds a
critical value, (∆b13/∆b12)
∗ (B). The optimal transition probability is intermediate (see the
dot in B). Probabilistic transitions may weaken the promotive effects of stochastic game
transitions on cooperation for ∆b13/∆b12 ≤ (∆b13/∆b12)∗ (C). Parameter values: k = 8,
c = 1.
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